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Henri de Waele 
Perspectives on Better Regulation in the  
EU – Between Microscopes and Telescopes 
For most people concerned with ensuring good governance, “Better 
Regulation” (BR) sounds like a nigh irresistible proposition. This is 
especially so when combined with a governmental pledge to be “big 
on big things, small on small things”.1 Under different names, the core 
ideas behind BR have in fact been on the European agenda for several 
decades already. Initially, the recipes were formulated with relative 
ease, undergoing repeated refinements and adjustments over the 
years. 2 As always, however, the proof of the pudding remains entirely 
in the eating: what have been the achievements of the BR program? 
Still today, alas, it does not seem appropriate to unfold a “mission 
accomplished!” banner. 
Definitions of the term “Better Regulation” have varied. The 
eponymous EU program is generally considered to boil down to a set 
of activities and instruments aiming to systematically appraise 
supranational policies and improve their workings. It comprises 
various processes, actors, tools and compacts, including legislative 
 
 
1  J. C. Juncker, “The Juncker Commission: The Right Team to Deliver Change”, 
Brussels, 10 September 2014. Online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
SPEECH-14-585_en.htm. 
2  See e.g. H. Xanthaki, “The Problem of Quality in EU Legislation: What on Earth is 
Really Wrong?”, (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review, pp. 651-676. 
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quality evaluations, consultations, and impact assessments.3 The self-
proclaimed “last chance” Commission of Jean-Claude Juncker that 
took office in 2014 launched a single set of methodological templates 
for BR activities. It moreover decided to reconfigure the existing 
oversight body, rebranding it the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). 
Also, an inter-institutional agreement was concluded between the 
Commission, Parliament and Council in 2016 that saw them all sign 
up to the carrying out of evidence-based analyses of amendments 
proposed in the Union’s law-making process.4 One particular new 
initiative focused on “regulatory fitness and performance” (REFIT) 
checks, mapping opportunities for simplification and reduction of 
unnecessary costs. 5  A mid-term review was published in 2017, 
followed by a report of the Court of Auditors. In the meanwhile, 
numerous scholars conducted their own inquiries into the subject-
matter.6 With the completion of the Juncker Commission’s term of 
office now close at hand, the time seems ripe to draw up some final 
eulogies or obituaries. 
In such studies, a crucial benchmark may be believed to lie in the 
(experienced quality of the) output. Allegedly however, with the 
choice for mechanisms such as impact assessment and ex-post 
consultation, which invite a wider feedback and participation, high 
public expectations were raised as well with regard to input and 
throughput legitimacy.7 Under REFIT, a specific ambition has been 
the identification of proposals in need of withdrawal, as an essential 
part of the promise to “cut red tape”. Correspondingly, no less than 
 
3  C. Radaelli, “Halfway through the Better Regulation Strategy of the Juncker 
Commission: What Does the Evidence Say?”, (2018) 56 Journal of Common 
Market Studies, p. 85. 
4  O.J. [2016] L 123/1. 
5  European Commission, “Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme – 
Scoreboard Summary”, 24 October 2017, p. 4. 
6  See e.g. S. Garben and I. Govaere (eds.), “The EU Better Regulation Agenda – 
A Critical Assessment” (Oxford: Hart/Bloomsbury 2018). 
7  A. Alemanno, “Better Regulation: Holding Martin Selmayr Accountable”, 
available on SSRN. See: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3251856. 
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73 proposals were retracted in 2015 alone. Yet, due to the lack of 
preceding evidence-based analyses of their merits, this move caused 
an unexpectedly broad upset – amounting to a “false start” in the eyes 
of many commentators. The conceptual fuzziness of the REFIT 
agenda, simultaneously pursuing a set of highly diverse goals, also 
cast persistent doubts with regard to its scientific foundations.8  
In quantitative terms, the operation has nevertheless borne some fruit. 
For instance, the number of Commission outputs at the end of 2018, 
compared to those in 2014, can be seen to accord with the “doing less 
more efficiently” paradigm.9 Commentators have equally lauded the 
novel emphasis on consultation, the effective reform of the RSB, and 
the introduction of ex post evaluations into the policy cycle. All the 
same, the question is left open whether the efforts resulted in an 
enduring, measurable increase in quality of the EU rules. In similar 
vein, the Commission has been said to disingenuously deploy causal 
plots, doomsday scenarios and narrative dramatization in its impact 
assessments, in order to garner consensus and support for the 
proposals it wishes to maintain.10 
The current volume originates in an academic gathering where 
attempts were made to comprehensively take stock of the BR 
program, challenge vested assumptions, and advance the existing 
knowledge base. The four main chapters in this booklet contain a 
digest of two thematic and two sectoral seminar contributions, 
employing innovative telescopic techniques alongside microscopic 
ones. First, Helen Xanthaki outlines an original argument for 
determining the success of the BR program on the basis of its own 
principles and intentions. She identifies several shortcomings in this 
regard, and calls for greater compliance with the formulated 
 
8  Radaelli (n. 2), p. 90. 
9  S. Blockmans et al., What Comes After the Last Chance Commission? (Brussels: 
CEPS 2019), p. 15. The Commission did develop an obfuscating tendency to bundle 
proposals and label them as a single package. See: https://www.politico.eu/ 
article/commission-juncker-less-regulation-promise-falls-short/. 
10  C. Radaelli, C. Dunlop, O. Fritsch, “Narrating Impact Assessment in the European 
Union” (2013) 12 European Political Science, p. 500. 
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guidelines and tools. To her mind, the alternative only risks to alienate 
EU citizens further. Next, Stijn van Voorst and Ellen Mastenbroek 
present the outcomes of their research on ex-post legislative 
evaluation, exposing that the Commission tends to concentrate on 
evaluating directives and complex legislation. Moreover, it appears 
that evaluations by external evaluators are of higher quality than 
internal evaluations. Overall, they do believe that the Commission has 
upped its game over the years, and performs relatively well on this 
front. Hereafter, in a sectoral assessment of the environmental 
domain, Barbara Beijen zooms in on developments with regard to the 
many directives in the field concerned. In an earlier study, she found 
that several such instruments were poorly aligned with each other, 
that problem definitions were often ill-defined, that their scope was 
very extensive, and often heavily reliant on soft law. According to 
her, despite the grand ambitions that have been formulated, the 
improvements in recent years only seem marginal. Finally, Pieter 
Kuypers delivers his assessment of the BR agenda in the domain of 
public procurement. One of the goals here has been to make the rules 
more accessible. Kuypers notes, however, that the volume of 
legislation over the last decade has doubled, and became increasingly 
detailed instead. He proposes a reversion to simpler wording, as well 
as an outright decrease in legislation, also with an eye to avoiding 
gold-plating – the maligned practice of Member States going wholly 
or partially beyond EU requirements in their domestic 
implementation.  
At the end of the seminar, it was argued that contemporary researchers 
have just begun to scratch the surface of BR policies and outputs, and 
obviously, the selected contributions provide plenty of food for 
further thought themselves. The concluding roundtable morphed into 
a flagging of cross-cutting issues that are yet to be addressed 
satisfactorily. For starters, one may wonder whether it is ultimately 
most advisable to resort to quantitative or rather to qualitative 
parameters when gauging the success of any regulatory improvement 
scheme. The ever-increasing complexity of modern society suggests 
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an ever-fading feasibility of numerical reductions, with every new 
opening demanding the imposition of new constraints. Contrary to an 
established wisdom, “less” could thus never truly mean “more” here 
(notwithstanding that, preferably, the individual rules within an 
inevitable large quantity are themselves kept as compact as possible 
– as convincingly argued elsewhere in this volume).  
Second, there was the well-received opinion from multiple panelists 
that Better Regulation boils down to a necessarily continuous PR 
exercise. In other words, because of its structural appeal in the eyes 
of the public-at-large, no government can reasonably go without it; 
small wonder then that the EU keeps bringing it up. One might add 
that if the underlying idea had been properly internalized, there would 
indeed no longer be any need to trumpet it so loud and often.  
A third daring thesis pertained to the correct level of realization, 
whereby a BR program pushed predominantly “from the top” was 
considered bound to remain limited in effect. After all, its success will 
always stay critically dependent on a proper execution “further down 
the line”. Specifically in a polity that spans over two dozen countries 
with peculiar national idiosyncrasies and constitutional power 
divisions, this would appear to call for a principal realism and 
humility amongst the supranational nomenclature.  
At the panel’s closing, it was advocated that the popular creed of 
“doing less more efficiently” might well constitute a dual 
impossibility: instead, one ought to focus either on becoming more 
efficient, or on trying to do less. Arguably, the aforementioned slogan 
invokes a classic dilemma, whereas it is simply utopian for an atypical 
organization like the EU to accomplish both at the same time. 
On the whole, similar to the underlying seminar, this booklet offers 
but a snapshot of the current state of play, politically and 
academically. It hopes to enable readers to broaden their insights in a 
succinct fashion, inspecting the multifarious dimensions of the 
problématique from up close and afar. The timing of the publication 
coincides with the latest BR review of the Commission, completed in 
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the first half of 2019, so that the findings can be neatly juxtaposed. 
Despite the lofty intentions and the tentative achievements so far, it 
must be clear to the key stakeholders that there is still ample work left 
to be done. Whatever the future holds for EU governance, on the 
shoulders of Europe’s governing class continues to rest, as one author 
in this volume puts it, a “mammoth task”.
